Gender and household education expenditure in Pakistan by Aslam, Monazza & Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi
www.ssoar.info
Gender and household education expenditure in
Pakistan
Aslam, Monazza; Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Aslam, M., & Kingdon, G. G. (2008). Gender and household education expenditure in Pakistan. Applied Economics,
40(20), 2573-2591. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840600970252
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-106135
  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [University of Oxford]
On: 16 February 2010
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 773573598]
Publisher Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Applied Economics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713684000
Gender and household education expenditure in Pakistan
Monazza Aslam a; Geeta Gandhi Kingdon a
a Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
To cite this Article Aslam, Monazza and Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi(2008) 'Gender and household education expenditure in
Pakistan', Applied Economics, 40: 20, 2573 — 2591
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00036840600970252
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840600970252
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Applied Economics, 2008, 40, 2573–2591
Gender and household education
expenditure in Pakistan
Monazza Aslam* and Geeta Gandhi Kingdon
Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Pakistan has very large gender gaps in educational outcomes.
One explanation could be that girls receive lower educational expenditure
allocations than boys within the household, but this has never convincingly
been tested. This article investigates whether the intra-household allocation
of educational expenditure in Pakistan favours males over females.
It also explores two different explanations for the failure of the extant
‘Engel curve’ studies to detect gender-differentiated treatment in education
even where gender bias is strongly expected. Using individual level data
from the latest household survey from Pakistan, we posit two potential
channels of gender bias: bias in the decision whether to enrol/keep sons
and daughters in school, and bias in the decision of education expenditure
conditional on enrolling both sons and daughters in school. In middle and
secondary school ages, evidence points to significant pro-male biases in
both the enrolment decision as well as the decision of how much to spend
conditional on enrolment. However, in the primary school age-group, only
the former channel of bias applies. Results suggest that the observed strong
gender difference in education expenditure is a within rather than an across
household phenomenon.
I. Introduction
One plausible explanation for girls’ very inferior
educational outcomes relative to boys in Pakistan
would seem to be that girls receive less educational
expenditure than boys in the within-household
allocation of resources. When it has been tested
for other South Asian countries, no consistent
evidence of within-household gender differentials in
education expenditure has been found. The objective
of this study is to test whether the commonly used
indirect expenditure (Engel curve) methodology is
capable of discerning bias in the within-household
allocation of educational expenditures in Pakistan.
The detection of gender bias in intra-household
allocation of consumption has relied on two
approaches: (1) the direct comparison of expenditure
by gender, contingent on availability of individual
level data and (2) the indirect Engel curve
methodology which utilizes household level expendi-
ture data to infer differential treatment, by analysing
how changes in household gender composition lead
to changes in household consumption or expenditure
patterns. Much of the extant literature has, due to
lack of individual-level data, relied on the indirect
approach. This large literature investigating gender
biases in household consumption patterns has raised
numerous questions. In particular, the conventional
Engel curve approach has failed to detect gender
differentiated treatment in household allocations
even where outcomes bespeak large pro-male differ-
ences. Deaton (1997, pp. 239–41) remarks ‘It is a
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puzzle that expenditure patterns so consistently fail to
show strong gender effects even when measures of
outcomes show differences between boys and girls.’
Ahmad and Morduch (2002, p. 17) say ‘coupled
with evidence on (significant gender differences
in) mortality and health outcomes, the results on
household expenditures pose a challenge in under-
standing consumer behaviour’. Case and Deaton
(2003) say ‘it is not clear whether there really is no
discrimination or whether, for some reason that is
unclear, the method simply does not work’.
Several explanations have been advanced for
explaining this puzzle. One explanation is by Jensen
(2002) who argues that parents’ fertility behaviour
can lead to girls’ educational (and other) outcomes
being inferior to boys’ without there being any
parental discrimination in the within-household
allocation of educational (or other) resources.1
Another explanation, due to Rose (1999), is that
households’ inability to smooth consumption in the
face of shocks leads to parents sacrificing daughters
so that only the wanted girls survive; thus any lack of
gender bias in current allocations masks prior gender
bias in mortality selection. Yet another explanation
by Ahmad and Morduch (2002) suggests two-stage
budgeting, namely that parents’ choices about
aggregate expenditures is separable from their choices
about how those expenditures are allocated. In other
words, budget share on a commodity might remain
unchanged with a change in gender composition of
the household but parents might allot different
portions of a commodity to sons than daughters.
This will not show up in investigations of aggregate
expenditures but it will show up in examination of
individual outcomes.
Testing these explanations for the failure of the
Engel curve method to detect bias requires the
availability of individual level data on expenditures.
For instance, Jensen’s point implies that any observed
gender differences in educational expenditure at the
individual level could be across-household differences
due to endogenously differing household sizes for
girls and boys, rather than being due to within-
household pro-male parental bias in education
expenditure allocations. However, with individual
level data on expenditure, a family fixed effects model
becomes possible which is a powerful way of purging
endogeneity bias and examining whether the gender
gaps are a within- or across-household phenomenon.
We have individual level data on educational
expenditures to permit the estimation of such models.
The article has two objectives. Firstly, we test the
hypothesis that, in Pakistan, the allocation of house-
hold educational resources favours males over
females. Secondly, we investigate possible reasons
for the failure of extant studies to detect gender bias
in contexts where it is expected to exist. Data from
the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS,
2001–2002) are utilised to address both questions.
Although a large literature documents gender
biases in food consumption, only a few studies
investigate differential treatments in educational
expenditure, all these being for India (Subramanian
and Deaton, 1990, 1991; Subramanian, 1995;
Lancaster et al., 2003; Kingdon, 2005). On
Pakistan, to our knowledge, no study analyses
gender biases in educational allocations.2
As mentioned above, the reliability of the Engel
curve approach has been questioned in recent years
due to its failure to detect gender-differentiated
treatment even where it is strongly expected.
Kingdon (2005) proposes two possible reasons for
this failure: (1) the Engel curve approach uses the
incorrect functional form to model the mechanisms of
bias and (2) aggregated household level data mutes
the detection of gender biases.
On the first issue, the Engel curve technique
estimates a single budget share equation encompass-
ing two different mechanisms of bias, assigning equal
weight to the two. The two potential mechanisms of
bias are: (a) in the household’s decision of whether to
spend anything on a given commodity (the zero-
vs.-positive expenditure decision, called the ‘binary
decision’ in this article) and (b) in the household’s
decision of how much to spend conditional on
spending a positive amount (called the ‘conditional
expenditure decision’ in this article). Averaging
across the two (as is implicit in the Engel curve
technique) may dilute biases if gender bias occurs
through only one channel rather than both, or if the
biases in the two channels are in opposite directions.
For example, suppose a pro-male bias exists in
households’ first decision – i.e. a boy is associated
with a larger probability of positive spending on
education (i.e. of enrolment). Suppose also that,
conditional on enrolment, households spend more on
daughters’ than sons’ education either because they
belong to a select (e.g. more enlightened) group or
1 If parents have a preference for having at least one (or some desired number of) boys in the household, they will continue
child-bearing till that desired number is reached. This sort of behaviour will lead to girls in the population having more
siblings, higher average household size and lower per capita resources than boys. Lower per capita resources due to larger
household size imply that girls’ outcomes will be worse than boys’ even in the absence of any within-household differential
treatment of sons and daughters.
2 Studies by Deaton (1997) and Bhalotra and Attfield (1998) focus on food consumption.
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because it is genuinely costlier to educate daughters,
e.g. more expenditure may need to be incurred for
transport and school clothing for girls for safety and
modesty concerns. In this case, there will be
pro-female expenditure allocation in the second
mechanism. Averaging across these two divergent
mechanisms may mute gender effects even if there is
be pro-male bias in the former mechanism. The
researcher would be interested in knowing whether
significant bias occurs via either of the two mechan-
isms separately and whether it is the averaging across
the two mechanisms that leads to the conclusion of
nonbias. In other words, one would be interested not
only in the average unconditional expenditure on girls
and boys but also in the distribution of the
expenditure.3
To examine this first (‘averaging’) explanation of
the failure of Engel Curve methods, we will estimate
Hurdle Models to analyse the two household
decisions separately, i.e. the binary and conditional
expenditure decisions. This will highlight the two
possible mechanisms of bias in intra-household
allocations of educational expenditure.
The second potential explanation for the failure of
the Engel curve approach has to do with the nature of
the data. Previous studies have, perforce, used
aggregated household data to infer discrimination.
Typically, expenditure data on food, education and
health in household surveys is available for the entire
household rather than separately for each individual
member. The Engel curve technique attempts to
deduce differential treatment from household-level
aggregated data. It is possible that using household
level data somehow makes it more difficult to detect
gender biases in intra-household allocations.
To examine this second (aggregation) explanation,
we exploit the fact that we have data on educational
expenditure of each individual child in a given
household. This allows us to test whether data
aggregation is responsible for the failure of previous
studies to detect gender biases. A few recent studies
have attempted to analyse individual-level outcomes
to investigate differential treatment by gender in
different country environments – Hazarika (2000) for
Pakistan, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) for
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ethiopia and South Africa,
and Kingdon (2005) for India, with only the latter
study focusing on educational expenditure allocations
and the issues mentioned above.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II describes
the models and empirical strategies adopted
while Section III discusses the data and descriptive
statistics. The empirical results are discussed in
Section IV and the final section concludes.
II. Model and Empirical Strategy
We begin the analysis with the estimation of a
standard Engel curve linking budget shares on
educational expenditure with total household
expenditure and the demographic composition of
the household. We use the Working-Leser
specification as follows:
wi ¼ þ  ln xi
ni
 
þ  ln ni þ
X
k
nki
ni
 
þ ’zi þ i
ð1Þ
where
wi is the budget share of education of the ith
household. It is¼ (Exp_edu/Total exp);
xi is the total expenditure of the household;
ni is the household size;
ln(xi/ni) is the natural log of total per capita
expenditure;
nki/ni is the fraction of the household members
in the kth age-gender class where
k¼ 1 , . . . ,K refers to the Kth age-gender
class within household i;
zi is a vector of other household character-
istics such as household head’s education,
gender and occupation and dummy vari-
ables to capture province and region etc.
These variables are defined in the note to
Appendix Table A1;
i is the error term.
, , , k and ’ are the parameters to be estimated.
The Working-Leser specification will be relaxed to
allow for nonlinearity in log per capita expenditure
(LNPCE). The term ni allows for an independent
scale effect of household size. Since the nkis/ni
fractions add up to unity, one of them has to be
omitted from the regression. We allow for 14
age-gender groups: males and females aged 0–4,
5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–24, 25–60 and 61 and above
3 The conventional application of the Engel curve technique may fail to pick up bias against girls for another reason as well,
namely if the distributional assumptions about the dependant variable and thus the specification of the budget-share equation
are wrong. For instance, if the education budget-share for households with positive education spending is distributed log-
normally but, because the budget-share equation is fitted on all (zero and nonzero education budget-share) households, the
researcher has to use absolute budget-share rather than the log budget-share as the dependant variable, leading to incorrect
SEs. However, in large samples such as ours, this is not a particularly important worry.
Gender and household education expenditure in Pakistan 2575
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(omitting the fraction of women aged 61 and above
in the regression analysis).4 The age categories 5–9,
10–14 and the 15–19 were chosen to correspond
roughly with primary, middle and secondary-
school-ages respectively.5 The remaining age
categories represent the infants and young children
(0–4), prime-aged adults (25–60) and the elderly
(61 and above). The k coefficients capture the
effect of household composition on household
budgetary allocations. These coefficients tell us
what the effect of changing household composition
is while holding household size constant, for example
by replacing a child aged 5–9 by a child aged 10–14
or by replacing a male with a female in a given age
category. The difference across gender can be easily
tested using a F-test under the following null
hypothesis:
km ¼ kf ð2Þ
where m denotes males and f denotes females and k
refers to a given age-category. Testing, for example,
whether boys aged 10–14 are treated differently from
girls aged 10–14, we simply seek whether the
coefficient on M10TO14 (proportion of males aged
10–14 years in the household) is significantly different
from the coefficient on F10TO14 (proportion of
females aged 10–14 years in the household).
Existing applications of the Engel curve approach
fit OLS equations of the absolute education budget
share on the sample of all households (including those
with zero education expenditure). In so doing,
they implicitly assume that dependent variable – the
budget share of education (EDU_SHARE) – is
normally rather than log-normally distributed.
The reason for including all households in the
estimation is that some or much of the bias against
girls may occur in the decision of whether to enrol a
child in school, i.e. in the zero-vs.-positive spending
decision, wi¼ 0 vs. wi>0, rather than only in the
decision of how much to spend conditional on
enrolment.
In much of the existing literature, Equation 1 has
been estimated using OLS with household budget
share of food, education or health regressed on the
independent variables. Given the large proportion of
households reporting zero education expenditure and
the resulting censoring of the dependent variable,
OLS is not the appropriate model to apply in the
analysis of the education budget share. A simple
application of the OLS model to data that is censored
yields parameter estimates which are biased down-
wards (Deaton, 1997).6 Although the Tobit model is a
suggested alternative, it is identified only if the
assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity are
fulfilled (Deaton, 1997). Moreover, it assumes that a
single mechanism determines the choice between
w¼ 0 vs. w>0 and the amount of w given w>0.
In particular, @P (w>0 jx)/@xj and @E (w>0 j x,
w>0)/@xj are constrained to have the same sign.
An alternative to Tobit is the Hurdle model
(Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 536–38) which allows the
initial decision of w¼ 0 to be separate from the
decision of how much w is, given positive w.
‘Hurdle Models’ are two-tier models because the
‘hurdle’ or first tier is the decision of whether to
choose a positive w or not (w¼ 0 vs. w>0) and the
second tier the decision of how much to spend
conditional on spending a positive amount
(w jw>0). A simple Hurdle model can be written
as follows:
Pðw ¼ 0jxÞ ¼ 1ðxÞ ð3Þ
logðwÞjðx,w > 0Þ  Normal ðx, 2Þ ð4Þ
where w is the share of family budget spent on
education, x is a vector of explanatory variables,
g and  are parameters to be estimated while  is the
SD of w. Equation 3 shows the probability that w is
positive or zero, while the Equation 4 stipulates that
conditional on w>0, w jx follows a lognormal
distribution. In our data, the conditional education
budget share is indeed lognormally distributed.
The MLE of g is the probit estimator using w¼ 0
vs. w>0 as the binary response. The MLE of  is just
the OLS estimator of which is obtained from
the regression of log(w) on x using only those
observations for which budget share is positive
i.e. w>0. The consistent estimator of ^ is just the
usual SE from this latter regression. Because of the
assumption that conditional on w>0, log(w)
follows a classical linear model, estimation is fairly
straightforward. Using the following properties of
a lognormal distribution, it is easy to obtain the
4 These age-gender categories are defined as M0TO4, F0TO4, M5TO9, F5TO9, M10TO14, F10TO14 etc. and are
the proportion of males (M) and (F) aged 0–4, 5–19, 10–14 and so in a given household.
5 These age-groupings are the same as those used in Subramanian and Deaton (1991) and in Kingdon (2005) for India. While
regressions were also estimated for the 20–24 age category (corresponding with higher education ages), we do not report the
detailed findings for this age group here (see Aslam and Kingdon, 2005, for these results). Sample selection issues are stronger
for this age category because in this age, a high proportion of girls are married and do not live in their natal homes.
6 The effect of censored observations (zero consumption expenditure on an item) is a well-discussed issue in the Engle curve
literature. For instance, see Beneito (2003) and Yen (2005).
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conditional expectation of E(w jx, w>0) and the
unconditional expectation E(w j x):
Eðw j x,w > 0Þ ¼ exp xþ 
2
2
 
ð5Þ
Eðw j xÞ ¼ ðxÞ exp xþ 
2
2
 
ð6Þ
which can be easily estimated given ^, ^2and ^. One
can obtain the marginal effect of x on w by
transforming the marginal effect of log(w) and using
the exponent. Taking the derivative of the conditional
expectation of w with respect to x, we can obtain the
marginal effect of x on w in the OLS regression of
log(w) conditional on w>0. This is as follows:
@Eðw j x,w > 0Þ
@x
¼ : exp xþ 
2
2
 
ð7Þ
The combined marginal effect of x on w, i.e. taking
account of the effect of x on the probability
that w>0 and on the size of w jw>0, can be
obtained by taking the derivative of the uncondi-
tional expectation of w with respect to x. We can use
the product rule and take the derivative of the
unconditional expectation in (8) to obtain the
combined marginal effect as follows:
@Eðw jxÞ
@x
¼ ’ðxÞ exp xþ 
2
2
 
þðxÞ  exp xþ 
2
2
 
¼ f’ðxÞ þðxÞg: exp xþ 
2
2
 
ð8Þ
In the analysis that follows, we estimate three
equations for each province of Pakistan:
(i) Unconditional OLS equation of the budget
share of education (conventional Engel curve)
in the household level analysis, and OLS
equation of unconditional education expendi-
ture in the individual level analysis;
(ii) Probit equation of the binary decision whether
the budget share of education is positive at the
household level analysis, and the probit
equation of whether any positive educational
expenditure is incurred on the index child in
the individual level analysis;
(iii) Conditional OLS of log of budget share
of education in the household level analysis,
i.e. conditional on positive budget share of
education, and OLS of log of conditional
education expenditure in the individual level
analysis.
Equations (ii) and (iii) together are the Hurdle model
estimates. In equation (iii), we attempt to allow for
possible sample selectivity bias by estimating a
Heckman two-step model (more details later). Each
of these three equations are fitted on household and
individual level data. The difference between the two
lies in the level of aggregation of the data. Household
level equations are fitted for households with at least
one child aged 5–24 years. At the individual level we
estimate the same equations but, instead of the
dependent variable in the OLS equations being the
budget share of education (as in household level
analysis), the dependent variable is education expen-
diture on the individual child. Also, all the indepen-
dent variables are the same in household- and
individual-level equations except for gender: while
household level equations include proportion of
household members in 14 age-gender categories,
individual level equations simply use age of child
and the simple dummy variable MALE for gender.
Lastly, we also estimate all three individual-level
equations with family fixed effects. This deals with
the potential endogeneity of variables included in all
our other equations, i.e. of variables such as house-
hold per capita expenditure, household size and
household head’s occupation. It provides a convin-
cing way of examining whether differential educa-
tional expenditures on girls and boys are within- or
across-household phenomena in Pakistan.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from the fourth round of the Pakistan
Integrated Household Survey (henceforth PIHS)
2001–2002. The PIHS contains rich information on
more than 16 000 households from all regions of
Pakistan (GOP, 2002). The analysis is limited
to households with at least one child aged 5–24,
which reduces the sample to 14 680 households.
Among currently enrolled 5–24 year olds, almost
98% reported positive educational expenditures,
i.e. enrolment is virtually synonymous with incurring
positive education spending. The individual-level
analysis is based at the level of the individual child,
i.e. on 57 604 children of school-going age.7
7 The total educational expenditure (TOTAL_EDU) variable was truncated at Rs 25 000 to exclude outliers Only 0.6% of the
sample reported expenditures greater than Rs 25 000.
Gender and household education expenditure in Pakistan 2577
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The dependent variable in the conventional Engel
curve analysis is the share of educational expenditure
in total household expenditure. The PIHS reports
individual-level expenditure on each child currently
enrolled in school as well as total household level
expenditure on various items of consumption includ-
ing food, leisure, health and education. The education
budget share (EDU_SHARE) variable was created as
the fraction of educational expenditure in total
household expenditure.
In the first instance, we regress the household
budget share of education on the log of household per
capita expenditure (LNPCE) and its square
(LNPCE2), log of household size (LNHHSIZE), the
age-gender composition variables, and the z-vector
variables including the dummy variables for head’s
education, marital status and gender, and regional
and provincial dummies. This is the pooled sample.
To further disaggregate the analysis, we estimate
separate regressions for the various provinces and
further sub-divide the sample into urban and rural
regions to analyse whether gender differential
patterns differ across the regions and across prov-
inces, though we report only selected results here.8
Table 1 shows the sex-ratio in the 0–14 year age
group in sample households. There is considerable
variation across provinces and regions with Punjab
having the highest proportion of girls (49.5%) with
the lowest proportions in FATA, followed by
Balochistan and AJK. This suggests, a priori, that
gender biases in household expenditure allocation are
likely to be the highest in these three regions and the
least in Punjab. Table 1 also divides households with
children aged 0–14 into ‘girls only’ households and
‘boys only’ households. There is a statistically very
significant difference in mean budget share on
education in girls-only and boys-only households.
Finally, Table 1 computes average household size
by gender and province. Average household size
is significantly different for boys and girls in
Balochistan and Northern Areas. These statistics
give some credence to Jensen’s (2002) argument that
due to parents’ fertility behaviour female children will
have a larger number of siblings and larger household
size than male children, suggesting that girls may
get less educational resources not because they are
discriminated against within their own household but
rather because they are more likely than boys to live
in larger households.
Table 2 presents current enrolment rates and
Table 3 reports the average unconditional educational
expenditure of all children (enrolled and nonenrolled)
and the average conditional education expenditure i.e.
expenditure on currently enrolled children. These are
disaggregated by age-group and gender in each of the
provinces and territories of Pakistan.
Table 2 reveals wide disparities in enrolment
between males and females across provinces in
Pakistan. Table 3 shows very significant differences
in average male and female unconditional educa-
tional expenditures across the provinces. The
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
Balochistan and North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) emerge as the provinces with the largest
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, by province
Proportion
of ‘girls-only’
households
(age 0–14)
Mean budget
share of
education
in ‘girls-only’
households
(age 5–24)
Mean budget
share of
education in
‘boys-only’
households
(age 5–24)
Mean budget
share of
education in
all households
(age 5–24)
Average
household
size (girls)
Average
household
size (boys)
t-value of
difference
in (b) and (c)
t-value of
difference
in (e) and (f)
Province (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Pakistan 14.5 2.0 4.1 4.6 9.4 9.3 11.8 1.1
Punjab 16.7 2.5 4.6 5.5 8.4 8.2 7.1 1.7
Sindh 13.6 1.9 3.8 3.8 9.8 9.7 5.4 1.3
NWFP 12.6 1.6 4.5 4.6 10.2 10.2 6.8 0.6
Balochistan 13.3 0.6 1.8 2.4 9.9 9.7 4.6 2.0
AJK 14.0 3.4 6.8 7.9 8.3 8.4 3.9 1.0
North 12.1 3.1 6.8 6.9 9.5 9.2 2.3 2.2
FATA 11.0 0.1 1.6 1.7 10.9 10.8 3.0 0.6
Note: Shaded cells represent significance at 10% or better.
8 See Aslam and Kingdon (2005) for all the disaggregated results.
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gender differences. Finally, focussing on conditional
expenditure makes clear that once enrolled in school,
girls generally do not receive significantly lower
educational expenditures than boys. For Pakistan
as a whole, in the 10–14 age-group conditional
educational expenditure is significantly higher on
girls (Rs. 2063) than on boys (Rs. 1941). The raw data
in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that much of the gender
differentiated treatment occurs in terms of parents’
decision whether or not to enrol/keep boys and girls
in school i.e. in girls’ significantly lower probability
of positive education expenditure, rather than in
lower expenditures conditional on enrolment.
IV. Empirical Results
The results of the empirical analysis are divided into
two sub-sections. In the first, household level analysis
is conducted to explore two main questions: (1) using
Table 3. Annual educational expenditure on ALL children and enrolled children only, by age and gender
Age 5–9 Age 10–14 Age 15–19 Age 20–24
Province M F t M F t M F t M F t
All (enrolled and nonenrolled)
Punjab 1007 919 2.00 1456 1253 3.61 1499 1045 5.74 611 356 3.40
Sindh 859 762 1.45 1213 1041 2.00 1296 861 4.25 608 318 3.47
NWFP 852 561 5.12 1442 712 10.24 1556 554 10.61 863 226 5.50
Balochistan 508 280 5.37 813 476 6.25 783 302 6.95 331 74 5.07
AJK 1887 1363 3.33 2590 1840 3.90 2474 1435 4.20 1153 491 2.50
North areas 759 559 2.30 1578 1066 4.32 1775 1042 2.98 467 184 1.66
FATAa 356 54 5.25 744 10 8.39 577 0 3.92 218 0 1.52
Pakistan 874 709 6.34 1338 997 10.27 1389 820 12.79 618 284 7.98
Enrolled only
Punjab 1535 1503 0.51 2126 2166 0.51 4208 3878 1.76 7457 6259 1.71
Sindh 1645 1988 2.51 2083 2306 3.83 4189 4843 1.99 7053 6751 1.03
NWFP 1362 1263 0.99 1844 1708 1.19 3285 3039 0.95 6446 4377 2.04
Balochistan 1109 916 1.91 1262 1284 0.23 2226 2086 0.59 3212 2874 0.60
AJK 2239 1890 1.90 2843 2292 2.62 4124 3744 0.98 7448 6568 0.71
North areas 1421 1215 1.49 1743 1522 1.65 2409 2616 0.52 2246 3583 1.04
FATA 919 1228 0.92 1218 421 1.33 3086 – – 6040 – –
Pakistan 1495 1513 0.39 1941 2063 2.38 3629 3695 0.57 6260 5646 1.54
Notes: M denotes ‘male’ and F denotes ‘female’; t depicts the t-value. All cells where the gender difference is significant at the
10% level or better are shaded.
FATA contains no observations for enrolled girls in the 15–19 and 20–24 age categories.
aDespite Table 1 revealing a current enrolment of 2% for females in FATA, the three observations on currently enrolled
females in the FATA sub-samples reported educational expenditures of 0 in the 10–14 age group.
Table 2. Current enrolment rate, by age and gender
Age 5–9 Age 10–14 Age 15–19 Age 20–24
Province M F Gap M F Gap M F Gap M F Gap
Punjab 66 61 5*** 69 58 11*** 36 27 9*** 8 6 2***
Sindh 52 39 13*** 58 39 19*** 31 18 13*** 9 5 4***
NWFP 63 45 18*** 79 42 37*** 48 18 30*** 13 5 8***
Balochistan 46 31 15*** 65 37 28*** 35 15 20*** 10 3 7***
AJK 84 72 12*** 91 81 10*** 60 40 20*** 15 7 8**
Northern Areas 54 47 7* 91 70 21*** 74 40 34*** 21 6 15***
FATA 40 5 35*** 61 2 59*** 19 2 17*** 4 1 3
Pakistan 59 47 12*** 69 49 20*** 38 22 16*** 10 5 5***
Notes: *** , ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
M denotes ‘male’ and F denotes ‘female’.
NWFP¼North West Frontier Province, AJK¼Azad Jammu and Kashmir and FATA¼Federally Administered
Tribal Areas.
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the conventional Engel curve approach, is there any
evidence that the allocation of household educational
expenditure favours males over females? And (2) does
incorrect functional form explain failure of the
conventional Engel curve method in picking up
gender bias? This analysis is based on a comparison
of the conventional Engel curves with Hurdle Models
using household level data. The second sub-section
explores whether aggregation of data at the
household level can explain failure to detect gender
bias where it is expected. To this end, we estimate
unconditional OLS and the Hurdle models using
individual-level data, which are compared to the
results from the household-level analysis.
In the first instance we discuss the main findings
on the Pakistan sample as a whole. This is
disaggregated by region (urban and rural). The
main results in Tables 4–6 are also presented by
Table 4. Difference in marginal effects (DME) 100 of gender variables and p value of the associated test (HH level results)
Probit of
ANYEDEXP
Conditional OLS
of EDU_SHARE
Combined probitþ
conditional OLS
Unconditional OLS
(conventional Engel curve)
Province Sample size (a) (b) (c)¼ f(a, b) (d)
Panel A: Males 5–9 and females 5–9
Pakistan Full 37.35 (0.00) 5.09 (0.46) 2.50 (0.00) 1.77 (0.00)
Urban 20.84 (0.01) 0.84 (0.51) 0.91 (0.01) 0.82 (0.50)
Rural 44.57 (0.00) 1.14 (0.15) 2.85 (0.00) 2.41 (0.00)
Full sample
Punjab 12.97 (0.19) 1.14 (0.37) 1.78 (0.16) 1.35 (0.19)
Sindh 53.54 (0.00) 1.32 (0.29) 1.78 (0.08) 1.37 (0.18)
NWFP 60.06 (0.00) 0.36 (0.77) 2.66 (0.03) 1.53 (0.27)
Balochistan 61.33 (0.00) 0.73 (0.72) 2.96 (0.01) 1.40 (0.09)
AJK 27.84 (0.04) 3.40 (0.22) 5.51 (0.09) 3.72 (0.24)
North 18.65 (0.13) 2.92 (0.59) 1.16 (0.81) 4.45 (0.19)
FATA 67.37 (0.17) 7.29 (0.00) 4.51 (0.01) 3.80 (0.01)
Panel B: Males 10–14 and females 10–14
Pakistan Full 60.15 (0.00) 3.30 (0.00) 5.80 (0.00) 3.22 (0.00)
Urban 4.46 (0.61) 2.71 (0.06) 2.63 (0.06) 1.28 (0.42)
Rural 91.40 (0.00) 3.68 (0.00) 6.70 (0.00) 5.57 (0.00)
Full sample
Punjab 36.42 (0.00) 1.72 (0.22) 3.90 (0.00) 1.53 (0.28)
Sindh 12.39 (0.00) 2.82 (0.04) 4.63 (0.00) 1.04 (0.56)
NWFP 94.42 (0.00) 6.58 (0.00) 9.85 (0.00) 7.49 (0.00)
Balochistan 101.90 (0.00) 1.43 (0.63) 5.04 (0.00) 3.61 (0.00)
AJK 25.80 (0.03) 9.28 (0.00) 11.02 (0.00) 10.10 (0.01)
North 3.43 (0.83) 4.21 (0.39) 3.68 (0.49) 6.01 (0.16)
FATA 193.44 (0.00) 9.22 (0.00) 8.21 (0.00) 8.41 (0.01)
Panel C: Males 15–19 and females 15–19
Pakistan Full 24.70 (0.00) 3.39 (0.00) 3.84 (0.00) 3.13 (0.00)
Urban 8.85 (0.23) 0.60 (0.72) 1.19 (0.45) 0.20 (0.90)
Rural 36.40 (0.00) 5.21 (0.00) 5.04 (0.00) 5.57 (0.00)
Full sample
Punjab 15.31 (0.11) 2.80 (0.14) 3.18 (0.04) 3.03 (0.07)
Sindh 48.50 (0.00) 3.12 (0.04) 4.32 (0.00) 1.94 (0.28)
NWFP 19.31 (0.15) 5.02 (0.00) 4.34 (0.00) 4.76 (0.01)
Balochistan 15.23 (0.43) 5.60 (0.02) 3.82 (0.05) 1.68 (0.21)
AJK 6.09 (0.44) 5.38 (0.08) 5.67 (0.12) 7.22 (0.06)
North 45.69 (0.01) 9.86 (0.18) 5.40 (0.54) 3.14 (0.48)
FATA 53.87 (0.50) 10.25 (0.08) 5.41 (0.16) 8.05 (0.17)
Notes: The figures in parentheses are p-values of the t-test of the DME and the shaded cells represent significance at 5%.
The DME in the conditional OLS equation in Column (b) were transformed as the dependent variable of the conditional OLS
equation is the natural log of the budget share of education for the household while the dependent variable in (d) is the budget
share of education. Column (b) reports results after transforming the dependent variable of the conditional into absolute
terms. The DME have been multiplied by 100. The SEs of the t-test in column (c) were obtained using bootstrapping
in STATA.
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province – Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan, AJK,
Northern regions (North) and FATA – to allow for
area-based differences in expenditure allocations
within households.9 However, to conserve space we
Table 5. Marginal effect of the gender dummy variable MALE and p value of the associated t-test, different age group
(Individual-level results)
Probit of
ANYEDEXP
Conditional OLS
of TOTAL_EDU
Combined probitþ
conditional OLS Unconditional OLS
Province Sample size (a) (b) (c)¼ f(a,b) (d)
Panel A: Age group 5–9
Pakistan Full 0.142 (0.00) 96.84 (0.00) 195.47 (0.00) 174.20(0.00)
Urban 0.067 (0.00) 143.45 (0.00) 216.42 (0.00) 215.20(0.00)
Rural 0.169 (0.00) 83.95 (0.00) 168.19 (0.00) 161.00(0.00)
Full sample
Punjab 0.059 (0.00) 93.19 (0.00) 130.31 (0.00) 118.6 (0.00)
Sindh 0.171 (0.00) 20.53 (0.52) 160.54 (0.00) 96.0 (0.01)
NWFP 0.192 (0.00) 24.67 (0.89) 102.09 (0.99) 277.0 (0.00)
Balochistan 0.170 (0.00) 76.20 (0.17) 159.75 (0.00) 210.0 (0.00)
AJK 0.119 (0.00) 389.64 (0.00) 536.79 (0.00) 436.8 (0.00)
North 0.072 (0.07) 24.67 (0.89) 102.10 (0.99) 187.4 (0.02)
FATA 0.346 (0.00) 19.70 (0.91) – 286.5 (0.00)
Panel B: Age group 10–14
Pakistan Full 0.261 (0.00) 174.84 (0.00) 498.88 (0.00) 380.6 (0.00)
Urban 0.653 (0.00) 263.73 (0.00) 343.65 (0.00) 261.7 (0.00)
Rural 0.368 (0.00) 136.62 (0.00) 510.91 (0.00) 440.7 (0.00)
Full sample
Punjab 0.125 (0.00) 49.88 (0.32) 249.13 (0.00) 223.5 (0.00)
Sindh 0.277 (0.00) 199.76 (0.00) 474.34 (0.00) 241.9 (0.00)
NWFP 0.399 (0.00) 428.69 (0.00) 780.06 (0.00) 708.0 (0.00)
Balochistan 0.375 (0.00) 31.04 (0.74) 429.94 (0.00) 388.1 (0.00)
AJK 0.115 (0.00) 630.47 (0.00) 826.21 (0.00) 763.0 (0.00)
North 0.207 (0.00) 19.40 (0.96) 505.87 (0.06) 536.3 (0.00)
FATA 0.606 (0.00) – – 727.6 (0.00)
Panel C: Age group 15–19
Pakistan Full 0.192 (0.00) 375.39 (0.00) 613.98 (0.00) 583.3 (0.00)
Urban 0.087 (0.00) 319.59 (0.00) 398.91 (0.00) 394.7 (0.00)
Rural 0.239 (0.00) 445.45 (0.00) 671.03 (0.00) 699.4 (0.00)
Full sample
Punjab 0.093 (0.00) 400.96 (0.00) 390.11 (0.00) 390.7 (0.00)
Sindh 0.168 (0.00) 498.90 (0.00) 518.64 (0.00) 478.0 (0.00)
NWFP 0.316 (0.00) 656.29 (0.00) 931.55 (0.00) 960.8 (0.00)
Balochistan 0.244 (0.00) 476.30 (0.01) 539.81 (0.00) 547.1 (0.00)
AJK 0.219 (0.00) 202.20 (0.54) 828.24 (0.00) 883.7 (0.00)
North 0.380 (0.00) 186.22 (0.03) 567.81 (0.55) 536.3 (0.00)
FATA – – – 531.8 (0.02)
Notes: The figures in parentheses are p-values of the t-test of the DME of the MALE dummy computed using MALE¼ 1 and
MALE¼ 0 and the shaded cells represent significance at 5%. The DME in the conditional OLS equation in Column (b) were
transformed as the dependent variable of the conditional OLS equation fitted only on positive expenditure households is the
natural log of total expenditure on education for the household while the dependent variable in (d) is the absolute value of
total educational expenditure. Column (b) reports results after transforming the dependent variable of the conditional into
absolute terms. The SEs for the t-test in column (c) were obtained by bootstrapping in STATA.
9 The provinces were also disaggregated by region (urban and rural). A total of 54 equations have been estimated. There are
four provinces and three territories in Pakistan. We also wish to present results for Pakistan as a whole, thus making eight
geographical units. For five of these units, we have broken the unit up into three samples: rural, urban and whole
(ruralþ urban). Thus, in total we have (5 3)þ 3¼ 18 separate samples. For each of these samples 3 different equations have
been fitted, implying a total of 18 3¼ 54 equations using household level data. Table A1 does not report results by province
due to space constraints. Tables 4 and 5 also do not report results by regional categorization for the different provinces.
Disaggregated results are available in Aslam and Kingdon (2005).
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do not present the full underlying equations sepa-
rately for each province in the Table A1 regressions,
but merely report the main results of interest in
Tables 4, 5–6 from those underlying equations. In the
individual-level equations, the SEs are robust for
clustering at the household level.
Household-level outcomes
Conventional Engel curve evidence. Table A1 reports
the results for Pakistan as a whole, both for urban
and rural areas. Column (a) reports the conventional
Engel curve equation, column (b) reports a probit of
ANYEDEXP (whether household’s budget share of
education was positive) and the third column, (c),
reports the conditional OLS equation of the log of
budget share of education. As the mean of the
dependent variable in column (a) at the bottom of
Table A1 shows, on average, households in Pakistan
devote 4.6% of the total household budget to
education with urban areas spending a larger share
(6.7%) as compared to the rural regions (3.5%).
This national average masks large differences across
provinces and regions. The regional variation is not
unexpected given that average incomes and possibly
educational preferences vary across provinces.
In column (a), per capita expenditure and its
square are significant. The coefficient on household
size is highly significant and positive and this was also
so across all provinces and regions. This could be
evidence of economies of scale but an alternative
explanation is that larger households are more likely
to have children of school-going age which is why
they spend a greater budget share on education.10
Female headed households (HEAD_FEMALE) have
significantly higher education budget shares in
Pakistan as a whole. As compared to households
with more educated heads (in the base category,
HEAD_FAMORE), those with heads with primary,
middle and matric education have significantly lower
education budget shares. Relative to households
with heads in elementary and agricultural occupa-
tions (in the base category), those with heads in white
collar and service and trade related jobs are inclined
to spend a greater proportion of total household
expenditure on education.
We now turn to the question of most interest here:
what do the conventional Engel curve estimates tell
us about gender difference in the allocation of
educational expenditure in Pakistan? To address
this question, p-values of the F-tests – for the null
hypothesis that the coefficients of the age-gender
dummies for males and females are equal – are
presented in the last four rows of column (a) of
Table A1. For example, the p-value of the F-test that
the coefficient on M5TO9 equals the coefficient on
F5TO9 for Pakistan (full sample) is 0.0001, suggest-
ing that education budget share increases by sig-
nificantly more when an extra boy aged 5–9 is added
to the household than when an extra girl of that age is
added. This suggests very significant bias against
females in education expenditure in the 5–9 age
range. There is very significant pro-male bias in the
10–14 and 15–19 age groups as well. Much of this
bias manifests itself in rural areas. In equations
estimated by province (but not shown for space
reasons) bias in the 5–9 age group manifests itself in
rural areas of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and FATA and
in urban Balochistan. The reason why there is
apparently not much differential treatment among
the youngest age group (ages 5–9) in the other areas
of Pakistan could be because of incorrect functional
form or aggregation issues and we turn to Hurdle
Models next to investigate this concern.
‘Averaging’ explanation for the failure of the Engel
curve method. Table A1, columns (b) and (c) report
Hurdle Model estimates, using household level data.
Column (b) presents estimates from the first ‘hurdle’
– the probability that the household spends anything
on education (ANYEDEXP), i.e. that it has a
positive education budget share. Column (c) presents
estimates of the second stage – the natural log of
education budget share (LNEDU_SHARE) condi-
tional on positive education budget share.
As mentioned before, the conditional budget
share equation could suffer from sample selectivity
bias due to being estimated only for a sub-sample
(households with positive education budget share,
i.e. with currently enrolled children), which could
be nonrandomly selected from the population.
We attempted to control for selectivity by using the
10 The theoretical literature suggests that at any given level of per capita resources, larger households will be better off because
they share household public goods, such as housing, consumer durables etc. Larger households should, therefore, be able to
allocate larger shares to private goods such as education provided they do not substitute towards the ‘cheaper’ public goods.
In Pakistani households, economies of scale could be especially important given the norm of a ‘joint family’ system. Deaton
and Paxton (1998) did not find evidence of such economies of scale across 7 high and low income countries, though they
examined food budget shares.
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Heckman two-step approach but in the absence of
convincing exclusion restrictions, we have not pro-
ceeded with this route.11 We recognize the possible
downward selectivity bias in the coefficients of the
gender-age composition variables. However, if selec-
tivity bias affects the male and female demographic
variables equally, then we need not worry since our
interest is in the difference in the coefficients of the
male and female demographic variables.12
In Table A1, the effect of LNPCE is concave and
significant in the probit of ANYEDEXP and also in
the conditional OLS equation in the full sample and
in urban and rural regions of Pakistan. An increase in
household size (LNHHSIZE) also has a positive and
very significant coefficient in both the probit and
conditional OLS equations. In Pakistan as a whole
and in rural Pakistan, female-headed households
have both a greater probability of spending a positive
amount on education and higher conditional educa-
tion budget shares.
Since our key objective is an analysis of gender
bias, our main interest lies in the effect of the
demographic variables on the two outcomes
(ANYEDEXP and LNEDU_SHARE) in columns
(b) and (c), and on the unconditional budget share
outcome (EDU_SHARE) in column (a) in Table A1.
Table 4 presents the difference in marginal effects
(DME) of the demographic variables in the three age
categories (ages 5–9, 10–14 and 15–19) calculated
from the results in Table A1. The province values
have been calculated similarly but the underlying
equations are not reported to conserve space. In
keeping with our previous analysis, we disaggregate
the results by region.
To see how the DME has been calculated, consider
the DME of the demographic variables M5TO9 and
F5TO9 for Pakistan as a whole, reported in the probit
equation in column 1 in Panel A of Table 4. For the
full sample, in column (b) of Table A1, the marginal
effect of M5TO9 in the probit equation is 1.1352.
The marginal effect of F5TO9 in the same equation is
0.7617, yielding a difference of 0.3735 which is
multiplied by 100 to yield a DME of 37.35. The
DMEs for the unconditional OLS (conventional
Engel curve equations) in column (d) in Panel A of
Table 4 have been calculated similarly using column
(a) of Table A1. The DMEs in columns (b) and (c) in
Panel A of Table 4 have been calculated somewhat
differently. Column (b) refers to the DME in the
conditional OLS equation of the log of budget share
of education (LNEDU_SHARE). Since the depen-
dent variable in this equation was in logs, we
transformed the marginal effects of the male and
female variables before taking the difference between
the two, so as to ensure comparison with column (d),
where the dependent variable is EDU_SHARE rather
than the log of EDU_SHARE.13 Column (c) reports
the results of the DME of the combined marginal
effects of the probit and conditional OLS equations.
The combined marginal effects were computed using
STATA, in the way set out in Equation 8 in Section
II. The p-value of each DME is reported in the
bracket below it. For example, the p value of the
DME in column (d) for children aged 5–9 in urban
Balochistan is 0.04, suggesting that the DME there is
significant at the 4% level. The shaded cells represent
DMEs significant at the 5% level or better.
The results of main interest for the Pakistan sample
as a whole are in the top panel of Table 4. Several
interesting results emerge from an analysis of the
DME at the household level. Firstly, looking at
Panel A of Table 4, the conventional Engel curve
results in column (d) shows that in the 5–9 age-group,
while conventional Engel curve results suggest
a pro-male bias in the full and rural samples only,
the results reported in columns (a) and (b)
11 Three exclusion restrictions were used in controlling for possible sample selectivity: LAND_OWN (whether household
owns any agricultural land), LAND_ACRES (the amount of land owned by the household) and BUSINESS (whether the
household is an owner/proprietor of a nonfarm business). A priori, we might have expected a household owning agricultural
land or a business to have a higher demand for child labour, i.e. to affect the school enrolment (or positive education
expenditure) decision, but not to affect conditional educational expenditure. However, in no case were the exclusion
restrictions jointly significant at the 5% level. The F tests revealed that the p-values of the joint significance of the exclusion
restrictions in the probit of current enrolment were: 0.14 (age 5–9), 0.53 (age 10–14) and 0.06 (age 15–19). Only in the
20–24 age-group, the exclusion restrictions were jointly significant (at 4%), but the Lambda term was insignificant (t¼1.27).
12 If girls’ unobserved traits are important in parents’ decisions about their enrolment/education and boys’ traits are not
important (or less important) to parents’ decisions about their schooling, then any pro-male bias will be over-estimated
because the female demographic variables will suffer from greater downward bias in the conditional education budget share
equation than will male demographic variables.
13 For example for the full sample Punjab, the coefficients on M5TO9 and F5TO9 in the conditional OLS of
LNEDU_SHARE was bm¼ 0.9426 and bf¼ 0.7840 respectively. We can obtain the log transformations of these by using
the property of the log normal distribution that the conditional expectation of E(w j x,w>0) equals exp (xþ 2/2). The
Exp() for this sub-sample is 0.1838. Thus the transformed marginal effect for males is
bmExp()¼ (0.9426)  (0.0720)¼ 0.0679 and that for females is bf Exp(.)¼ (0.7840)  (0.0720)¼ 0.0565. The difference
between the male and female marginal effects is 0.0679 0.0565¼ 0.0114. In the table all DME are multiplied by 100 and so
the reported DME is 1.14.
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demonstrate differently. In both rural and urban
areas, the DME in the probit equation is positive and
highly significant: an additional boy in the household
has a larger impact on the probability of a nonzero
education budget share (ANYEDEXP) as compared
to an additional girl, i.e. there is strong pro-male bias
in the binary decision of allocating positive educa-
tional expenditure. However, the story is somewhat
different in column (b): the DME of the gender
variables in the conditional budget share equation is
negative (albeit insignificant) in the urban sample
and, when it is positive, it is insignificant (full and
rural sample). Thus, at least in the 5–9 age group in
Pakistan, much of the gender bias in household
educational expenditure allocation occurs at the stage
of the enrolment/drop-out decision for boys and girls,
rather than in the conditional decision of how much
to spend on enrolled boys and girls. It is clear that
averaging the (often) oppositely signed probit and
conditional expenditure DMEs – which is implicitly
what the Engel curve method does – leads to the
conclusion of no bias, and would miss the fact that
there is bias through one of the channels, namely in
the enrolment (positive spending) decision.
It is also noteworthy that the Hurdle model in
column (c) – which allows the binary and conditional
decisions to be modelled separately – has greater
power to detect bias than the conventional Engel
curve method (column d) which uses a single equation
to model bias: there is significant evidence of gender
bias in urban areas using the Hurdle model while the
Engel curve approach is unable to detect this.
This picture changes quite a lot in the 10–14 age
group (Panel B of Table 4). In this junior education
age group, the Engel curve is good at picking up
evidence of pro-male bias in Pakistan, see column (d).
This seems to be for two reasons. Firstly the size of
the DMEs is greater in the probit equation and
secondly, the DMEs in the conditional OLS are
almost always positive in this age group and also
statistically significant in many cases, i.e. both the
binary and conditional expenditure decisions work in
the same direction (rather than in opposite directions,
as was often the case in the 5–9 age group). Thus,
here not only do households favour males in their
zero-versus-positive expenditure decision (wi>0),
they also favour them in the amount spent conditional
on enrolment. The findings are similar in the 15–19
age group (Panel C of Table 4).
It is not clear what explains the lack of pro-male
bias in conditional education expenditure in the
primary age group but its presence in the junior and
secondary school age group. Simple tabulations and
corresponding t-values for the different educational
expenditures indicate that in no age-group is the cost
of schooling significantly higher for boys than for
girls such that cost-differences explain higher condi-
tional expenditure on boys.14 However, this doesn’t
entirely rule out lower conditional expenditure on
girls due to other supply-side factors. For instance,
lack of availability of single-sex schools in rural areas
may result in lower conditional education expendi-
ture on girls because of lack of access rather than due
to parental discrimination.15 However, there is also
evidence (Aslam, 2005) to suggest that male children
are more likely to be sent to more expensive private
schools in Pakistan and this could be one mechanism
by which pro-male biases in conditional expenditure
operate.
The results for Pakistan are corroborated when we
disaggregate by province in the three age-groups. For
example, in the 5–9 age group, the Hurdle model
detects pro-male bias in NWFP and Balochistan (and
in age group 10–14 in Punjab) which the Engel curve
is unable to detect. Punjab, generally known to be a
more progressive province, has no significant gender
bias in the 5–9 age group (although bias is present in
rural Punjab even in the 5–9 age group, this is not
shown in Panel A of Table 4).
The overall results suggest a number of conclu-
sions. Firstly, typically the two ‘discriminatory’
processes highlighted in the probit and conditional
OLS equations in the 10–14 and 15–19 age groups
reinforce each other. In these age groups in almost all
instances, the DMEs in columns (a) are (b) are
positive suggesting a pro-male bias in the zero-
vs.-positive expenditure decision as well as in the
conditional expenditure decision. Secondly, this
explains why the Engel curve method detects pro-
male bias in educational spending at least in the
10–14 and 15–19 age groups. Finally, ‘unpacking’ the
two mechanisms of bias sheds some light on
the puzzle we started with, namely the inability of
the Engel curve method to detect bias even where it is
strongly expected. The results above suggest that one
14 For instance, tuition fees for males and females aged 5–9, 15–19 and 20–24 are statistically insignificantly different from
each other (for the 10–14 age group they are significantly higher for girls). Similarly, the data suggest that expense on
transport is significantly greater for girls aged 10–14, 15–19 and 20–24.
15Alderman et al. (1996) attribute reduced availability of schools for females in rural Pakistan to lower adult cognitive
achievement while Lloyd et al. (2002) suggest that single-sex girls’ school availability is a key determinant of parent’s decision
to enrol girls in school in rural Pakistan.
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of the reasons for the failure of the Engel curve
method is its incorrect functional form. If the correct
model for the binary decision of whether to make a
purchase or not is nonlinear and the distribution of
conditional expenditure is log normally (rather than
normally) distributed, it is incorrect to model these
two different decisions within a single OLS budget
share equation, and especially so if the effects of the
age-gender variables on these two decisions are
in divergent directions, as they are in Pakistan in
the 5–9 age group.
‘Aggregation’ explanation of the Engel curve
method’s failure
One of the central limitations of studies investigating
gender bias in intra-household allocations has been
their reliance, perforce, on aggregated household
level data to infer who gets what within the house-
hold. Failure of the Engel curve method in detecting
differential treatment even where it is expected
a priori may be attributable to data aggregation.
Using individual level data on education expendi-
tures, we investigate whether this can be a
shortcoming of household allocation analyses in
urban and rural Pakistan.
In this section we compare the household level
Engel curve results with the estimates obtained using
individual level data. However, the two sets of results
are not directly comparable. Firstly, the dependent
variable in the individual level analysis is the
educational expenditure on the individual child
(TOTAL_EDU) rather than the household’s budget
share of education (EDU_SHARE), as in household
level analysis. Secondly, instead of using the 14
demographic variables ‘proportion of males aged 5–9’
(M5TO9), ‘proportion of females aged 15–19’
(F15TO19), etc. in individual level analysis we use
the simple dummy MALE (equals 1 if child is male,
0 otherwise), to capture the gender of the child. All
other independent variables are the ones used in the
household level analysis. Of course, the marginal
effects of MALE in the individual-level equations will
differ from the ‘difference in marginal effect’ of the
male and female demographic variables in the
household-level equations due to different scaling.
However, that does not matter as we are interested
primarily in whether the difference in marginal effects
(DMEs) of the gender variables in household level
equations are statistical significant in those
regions/areas where the marginal effect of MALE is
significant in the individual level equations.
As before with household level analysis, we
estimate three equations at the individual level for
each region: (1) probit of ANYEDEXP, (2) OLS of
LNTOTAL_EDU (conditional OLS), and (3) uncon-
ditional OLS of TOTAL_EDU. These equations
are estimated for the three age-groups separately:
ages 5–9, 10–14 and 15–19.16 We focus on the MALE
gender coefficient and report the marginal effects of
this variable in Table 5.17
In Table 5, columns (a) and (b) refer to the
marginal effects of the MALE variable in the probit
and the conditional OLS equations, respectively. As
before, the marginal effects in (b) have been
transformed from logs to absolute values for com-
parison with (d) where the dependent variable is total
educational expenditure. Column (c) reports the
combined marginal effects of the probit and condi-
tional OLS equation in the Hurdle model while (d)
presents the marginal effect of MALE in the simple
OLS of total educational expenditure.
The results based on individual level data confirm
the findings from the descriptive analysis. There is a
large and significant pro-male bias in the allocation
of educational expenditure in all age groups and in
both rural and urban regions in Pakistan. Comparing
the results in Table 5 with those in Table 4 shows that
individual level analysis is far more capable of
capturing gender bias than household level analysis.
In individual level analysis (Table 5), all cells in the
5–9, 10–14 and 15–19 age groups are statistically
significant while in the household level analysis, fewer
cells are statistically significant. This suggests that
there is no substitute for individual level analysis if
one wishes to reliably detect gender bias in the within
household allocation of educational resources.
Aggregation of data at the household level, an
inherent feature of previous studies on intra-
household resource allocation, mutes the true extent
of gender bias.
At the household level, much of the evidence for
gender bias against girls in the 5–9 age-group had
manifested itself in the probit equation of
ANYEDEXP (Panel A of Table 4). There was not
much evidence of pro-male bias in the conditional
OLS estimates or in the conventional Engel curve
estimation in this age-group. At the individual level,
however, differential treatment against females aged
5–9 is apparent in both mechanisms. These findings
16Although we estimated a total of 288 equations (aged 20–24 was a separate category and the results were disaggregated by
region for all provinces), as before we do not report all results. More detailed results are available in Aslam and Kingdon
(2005).
17 The full results of the individual-level regressions are available from the authors.
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are largely corroborated by provincial
disaggregation.
Household fixed effects: gender differences within or
across households?
Jensen (2002) argues that in some developing
countries, parents may have ‘son preferring, differ-
ential stopping behaviour’. If parents have a strong
preference for male children, they will continue child
bearing until one (or their desired number of) male
offspring is born. In other words, if early born
children are girls, parents will be less likely to stop
bearing more children than if the early borns are
boys. This type of fertility behaviour will imply that,
on average, female children will have a larger
number of siblings and larger household size than
male children. In larger households, all children
(male and female) are worse off than in smaller
houses, since larger family sizes result in a dilution
of household resources across children. Average
sibling size in Pakistan is 4.8 for girls and 4.7 for
boys, which is significantly different (Table 1). This
suggests that girls may get less educational resources
not because they are discriminated against within
their own household but rather because they are more
likely than boys to live in larger households. In
other words, any observed lower educational expen-
ditures on girls than boys could be an across-
household phenomenon due to differential household
sizes for girls and boys in the population. If
household size is endogenously chosen in the way
Jensen describes then simply controlling for house-
hold size as we have done previously, will not
suffice.
Introducing household fixed effects is a powerful
way of controlling for unobserved parental fertility
preferences and thus for the endogeneity of house-
hold size. Our household fixed effects analysis
estimates three equations using individual-level
data: (1) a probit equation of ANYEDEXP (whether
any positive expenditure was incurred on the child’s
education); (2) the equation of the log of educational
expenditure (LNTOTAL_EDU) conditional on posi-
tive educational expenditure; and (3) the uncondi-
tional educational expenditure (TOTAL_EDU)
equation. These equations are fitted on the sample
of only those households that have at least one child
of each gender in the relevant age range (ages 5–9,
10–14, 15–19). Estimates are obtained by age group
and province. As before, we discuss the Pakistan
results in detail. Of course, controlling for household
implies that coefficients only the child variables (age
and gender, MALE) are retained.
Table 6 reports results of the household fixed
effects estimation. We report the coefficient of the
MALE dummy in the three equations with the
t-statistic in brackets. We notice the large number
of significant values in all decisions – the decision to
enrol as well as the conditional and unconditional
expenditure decisions – at all age groups, though
there are some variations. There is pervasive evidence
of significant within-household pro-male bias in the
allocation of educational resources, and one cannot
attribute the results of previous tables simply to
differences in household size across the population.
The household fixed effects estimates constitute fairly
convincing evidence of strong pro-male bias in
educational decisions within households in Pakistan
in all school-going age-groups18: in the 5–9 age
group, a daughter is 13.5% points less likely than a
son to have any education expenditure incurred on
her education (i.e. to be enrolled in school); this rises
to 24% points in the 10–14 age group. Education
expenditure allocation differs dramatically for sons
and daughters within the household.
V. Summary and Conclusions
In this article we have examined two questions central
to the intra-household allocation literature: (i) does
the allocation of household educational resources in
Pakistan favour males over females and (ii) what
explains the inability of the standard Engel curve
approach to detect differential treatment even where
discrimination is known to exist? We exploit the latest
national sample survey, the Pakistan Integrated
Household Survey (PIHS 2001–2002), to address
both concerns.
The descriptive statistics reveal large and signifi-
cant gaps in schooling outcomes for males and
females of school-going age in Pakistani households.
These gender disparities are more strongly discernible
in Balochistan, NWFP and FATA, and in rural
areas. Much of the bias in educational expenditures
manifests itself in significantly lower probability of
girls’ enrolment, and hence zero expenditure, rather
than in lower expenditures conditional on enrolment.
The conventional (Engel curve) approach to
discovering differential treatment in intra-household
18As a referee of this journal points out, age gaps between siblings may differ for girls and boys within the household since a
new born’s gender may affect parental decisions about the spacing of the next birth (Angrist et al., 2005). The family fixed
effects approach does not address this issue or the possibility of time-varying unobserved household heterogeneity.
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allocations has been questioned in recent years for its
inability to detect biases in allocations even when
outcomes reveal differently. Two possible explana-
tions for this puzzle were tested: (1) that the
functional form adopted by the Engel approach is
too restrictive and (2) that data aggregation somehow
diminishes ability to detect gender biases. To explore
the first issue, we estimated Hurdle Models which
allow the two potentially ‘discriminatory’ channels of
bias – the zero-vs.-positive expenditure decision and
the conditional spending decision – to be modelled
separately, instead of constraining them to be in the
same direction. Additionally, the Hurdle Model
allows the functional forms of the two decisions to
be guided by the underlying distributions of the
education budget share. The binary decision is
modelled as a probit and the conditional expenditure
decision using OLS of the log of budget share since
budget share is distributed log-normally. The second
explanation – which has to do with aggregation of
data at the household level – is tested using unique
individual-level data on educational expenditures on
each child in the sample.
The results suggest several conclusions. Even using
the conventional Engel curve approach, robust
evidence of a pro-male bias in educational expendi-
ture is found especially in the 10–14 and 15–19 age-
groups. Much of this differential treatment manifests
itself in rural areas. The lack of evidence in the 5–9
age-group is puzzling given large gender differentials
in enrolment seen in Table 2. The Hurdle Models
highlight why this is the case. While there is
substantial evidence of strong pro-male bias in the
binary decision whether to spend anything on
education (the probit), there is weak pro-female bias
in the conditional expenditure decision, i.e. the two
potential channels of bias often go in opposite
directions. In the older age groups, both channels
typically work in the same direction, i.e. reinforce
each other. These results hold when using
individual level data. Hurdle models are better able
to detect gender bias in educational expenditure as
compared to the conventional Engel curve approach,
especially when using household level data.
Controlling for unobserved household preferences
by using household fixed effects confirms that the
large and significant pro-male biases in educational
expenditures in Pakistan are a within-household
phenomenon.
Furthermore, a comparison of individual and
household level results reveals that aggregating
expenditure data across individuals within a house-
hold mutes the ability to ‘pick up’ gender effects. The
findings suggest that individual level data are far
preferable to household level data if one wishes to
reliably estimate gender effects.
Whether the substantial gender differences
observed in within-household education expenditure
allocations constitute pure discrimination remains
arguable. Gender differentiated treatment could in
principle be attributed to an investment motive on
the part of parents, reflecting differential labour
market returns to education for males and females.
Evidence on Pakistan (Aslam, 2006) suggests that
while returns to education for women are signifi-
cantly higher than those for men, overall labour
market returns are higher for men since the latter
have much higher earnings than women.19 Thus, an
investment motive seems at least one plausible
explanation for gender bias within the household.
Even if returns to education were similar for males
and females (or even higher for females), the part
of the return to a child’s education that accrues to
the parents is likely to be higher from sons’
education than from daughters’ since in societies
such as Pakistan sons provide old age support for
parents while any economic returns to a daughter’s
education are reaped by her in-laws. This asym-
metry in parental incentives to invest in sons’ and
daughters’ education could well explain the
observed gender gaps in education expenditure
within Pakistani households and has obvious and
important public policy implications.
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